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I. DOES POWER CORRUPT? THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL LAW  
ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
A. Civil Liberties and Police Forces 
The conflict between the need to be secure and the need to be 
free is not new.  When England debated the establishment of its first 
modern police force in 1829, opponents expressed their fear of an 
omnipresent police force that would curtail civil liberties and usurp 
the role of judge and jury.1 
The concerns arising 180 years ago have since crossed the Atlan-
tic and emerged again and again in American debates about the 
proper limits of the role of law enforcement.2  Those debates have 
remained largely unchanged in form and content over the decades.3 
While commentators and members of the media debate the bal-
ance between liberty and security, the nation’s lawmakers are again 
considering whether to extend statutory provisions that give intelli-
gence agencies sweeping domestic power to encroach on the civil 
liberties of citizens.4  The conversations occurring in Washington, 
D.C., about oversight of federal law enforcement agencies such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation bear striking resemblances to 
 
 1. POLICE ASSESSMENT RES. CTR., REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICE OVERSIGHT MODELS 
5 (2005), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/Eugene/Review%20of%20
National%20Police%20Oversight%20Models%20%28Feb.%202005%29.pdf (tracing 
the development of the principles of limited police power that were later adopted by 
the New York City Police Department and other American police forces).   
 2.  Id. at 6.  Among the principles that the British Parliament adopted when it 
established the police force is one that echoes the civilian oversight values of today: 
“To recognize the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is 
dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behavior, and on their 
ability to secure and maintain public respect.”  Id. at 5–6. 
 3. See SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT 
20 (Wadsworth 2001) (detailing a history of police actions that have given rise to calls 
for civilian oversight); see also ZENITH GROSS & ALAN REITMAN, POLICE POWER AND 
CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW BOARD 33 (1966) 
(pamphlet published by the American Civil Liberties Union, including a history of 
extant civilian police review boards and the community incidents that gave rise to a 
movement to install a citizen review board); Mary M. Cheh, Legislative Oversight of 
Police: Lessons Learned From an Investigation of Police Handling of Demonstrations in 
Washington, D.C., 32 J. LEGIS. 1, 3–6 (2005) (reviewing the history of police clashes 
with protestors following meetings of international trade organizations and steps 
taken to install citizen oversight mechanisms to address critical incidents).  
 4. See, e.g., Editorial, Patriot Act Excesses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at A38; Ellen 
Nakashima & Carrie Johnson, Partial Patriot Act Extension is Approved by Senate Panel, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2009, at A1 (advocating a review of the PATRIOT Act, particularly 
to address missing civil liberties and privacy protections). 
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longstanding discussions that have occurred in American cities about 
how to oversee municipal police departments. 
America’s police officers are subjected to administrative,5 judi-
cial,6 and political7 scrutiny and oversight.  In America’s largest 
cities—and now, increasingly in its mid-sized cities—the police are 
frequently watched over by civilian agencies established to respond to 
instances of police misconduct.8   
The purpose of this paper is to present some reflections on what 
U.S. cities have learned about managing their police departments 
through the civilian oversight process and whether such a model of 
law enforcement oversight has any applications for the oversight of 
federal law enforcement agencies. 
This paper examines the successes and failures of America’s cities 
in instituting external civilian police oversight functions.  It then looks 
at the strengths and weaknesses of current mechanisms the federal 
government has in place to check the powers of federal law enforce-
ment.  Finally, the paper ends with a proposal for how a system of 
civilian oversight—inspired by the models used in American cities—
might function at a federal level.   
Although civilian oversight of police is not a panacea, this paper 
proposes that it is a system with several qualities that can be put to 
profitable use.  As policymakers work to create a more robust system 
of federal oversight, the lessons cities have learned in implementing 
civilian review suggest helpful solutions and admonish against making 
certain mistakes. 
B. The Growing Concern Over Federal Abuses of Power 
On April 27, 2005, then-U.S. Attorney General Alberto R. Gon-
zales appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee and assured 
lawmakers—who were considering whether to approve changes to the 
USA PATRIOT Act9—that “there has not been one verified case of 
 
 5. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE 
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 172 (1993). 
 6. Id. at 193. 
 7. Id. at 185. 
 8. National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, Resources, 
http://www.nacole.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=57 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (listing all U.S. cities with a civilian oversight agency as well 
as foreign nations with some form of civilian oversight). 
 9. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter the PATRIOT Act]. 
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civil liberties abuse” by federal agents under the provisions of the 
act.10  In fact, at the time of the attorney general’s testimony, he had 
received reports of at least a half-dozen episodes of legal or procedur-
al violations that were enabled by the expanded authority given to 
federal agents through the PATRIOT Act.11  
Three months after Gonzales’s testimony, Congress re-upped the 
PATRIOT Act, making permanent many of the statute’s provisions 
that had been hastily prepared in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.12  In 2007, an internal audit at the FBI revealed 
more than 1,000 instances of violations of law or agency rules while 
collecting data about phone calls, e-mails, and financial transactions.13  
The audit examined only ten percent of the agency’s national-security 
investigations conducted since 2002, suggesting that the actual 
number of violations exceeded, by orders of magnitude, those that 
were known.14  Moreover, the audit was confined to domestic 
surveillance investigations, leaving out a generous swathe of other law 
enforcement activities in which the agency engages.15 
C. The Balance Between Power and Oversight 
It is axiomatic that an increase in a government’s power to affect 
the civil rights of its citizens will also be accompanied by increased 
opportunities for abuses of such authority.16  Through the auspices of 
the PATRIOT Act, the U.S. government endeavors to “deter and 
punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world [and] 
to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools. . . .”17  Among the 
tools employed by the PATRIOT Act to accomplish its purpose is 
increasing opportunities for government surveillance of electronic 
 
 10. John Solomon, Gonzales Was Told of FBI Violations, WASH. POST, July 10, 2007, 
at A1. 
 11. Id. (“The acts recounted in the FBI reports included unauthorized 
surveillance, an illegal property search and a case in which an Internet firm 
improperly turned over a compact disc with data that the FBI was not entitled to 
collect. . . .”). 
 12. Eric Lichtblau, Senate Makes Permanent Nearly All Provisions of the Patriot Act, 
With a Few Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A1. 
 13. John Solomon, FBI Finds It Frequently Overstepped in Collecting Data, WASH. 
POST, June 14, 2007, at A1. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See WALKER, supra note 3, at 8 (describing how the work environment of 
policing creates ample opportunities for abuses of citizens, either as a result of an 
honest misjudgment or from evil motives). 
 17. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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communications of U.S. citizens,18 giving government officials greater 
authority to monitor and intercede in private banking transactions,19 
and allowing government access to citizens’ library records.20  The 
beneficiaries of the PATRIOT Act’s largesse are federal law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies, including the FBI, which are charged 
with using their enhanced powers to fight terrorism.21   
With some exceptions, commentators do not dispute that the 
United States government was correct in bolstering the power of its 
law enforcement agencies in light of the threats to national security 
that have become tragically salient over the last decade.22  But the 
expansion of federal law enforcement powers has not been accompa-
 
 18. Tammy J. Schemmel, WWW.STOPCYBERCRIME.COM: How the USA PATRIOT 
Act Combats Cyber-Crime, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 921, 926 (2003).  Schemmel notes 
that the PATRIOT Act allows law enforcement enhanced access to electronic 
communications by eliminating the jurisdictional boundaries of courts that had 
prevented internet service providers from handing over information.  One of the 
purposes of this paper is to address the risks of misconduct that are raised by the 
destruction of those jurisdictional boundaries.  Id. 
 19. Paul Schott Stevens & Thomas C. Bogle, Patriotic Acts: Financial Institutions, 
Money Laundering and the War Against Terrorism, 21 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 261, 262 
(2002). 
 20. Heather Hillary & Nancy Kubasek, The Remaining Perils of the Patriot Act: A 
Primer, 8 J. L. SOC’Y 1, 7 (2007) (“This clause of [the PATRIOT Act] causes concern 
among citizens because the government need only claim they are demanding the 
records because of anything involving terrorism, and the records must be handed 
over without the citizen ever knowing.”).  At present, the U. S. Senate is considering 
revisions to the PATRIOT Act that would curtail the authority of intelligence agencies 
to request library records and records of consumer purchasing habits without a more 
thorough accounting for the need to access the information.  See Evan Perez, Patriot 
Act Redo Clears Split Panel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2009, at A4, infra note 24 (discussing 
potential revisions to the PATRIOT act pending before the Senate). 
 21. Although this paper tends to scrutinize the FBI, as will be discussed below, 
the problems and principles of misconduct and oversight are not confined to a single 
federal law enforcement agency. 
 22. Compare Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 175, 179 
(2003) (“[T]he nation’s security ultimately must be a priority, and a condition 
precedent toward securing civil liberties. When the nation is secure, its people are 
secure and when a nation is under attack, civil liberties become secondary to national 
security.”), with Hillary & Kubasek, supra note 20, at 74 (“It is understandably 
necessary that in times when national security is at risk, the government will be 
granted more powers, further reach, and access to more information, but there needs 
to be a limit on these powers and necessary measures in place to prevent an abuse of 
this power.”).  But see Anne Uyeda, The USA Patriot Act May Infringe on Civil Liberties in 
Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, n.1 (2002) (“Although ostensibly designed in 
response to the events of September 11th, most of the bill’s provisions actually have 
more of an impact on the lives of innocent Americans, rather than hostile terrorists.  
By endowing domestic and national law enforcement agencies with an expansive 
power to spy on the on-line activities of people, the government may well have 
sacrificed the privacy rights of individuals in its quest to protect the nation.”). 
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nied by a commensurate expansion in oversight.23  From involvement 
in acts of torture to retaliation against whistleblowers, the FBI is 
increasingly subject to public criticism and efforts by legislators to 
address and prevent ethical and civil liberties violations by reforming 
institutional oversight.24 
Two core assumptions must be challenged and modified to bring 
oversight to such organizations as the FBI: first, that unobstructed 
broad authority is required to achieve absolute security; and second, 
that security considerations are always incompatible with and superior 
to preservation of individual rights.25  
But, as discussed below, many American cities have attempted to 
address analogous assumptions on the local level to bring external 
oversight to their police departments. The conversations occurring in 
American cities may provide fruitful information for the national 
dialogue on intelligence and federal law enforcement oversight. 
II. CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE POLICE 
A. The Growth and Current Status of Civilian Oversight in the United 
States 
Civilian oversight is defined as “a procedure through which the 
investigation and disposition of citizen complaints against police 
officers that involves some input from individuals who are not 
themselves sworn officers.”26   
 
 23. Electronic Privacy Information Center, USA Patriot Act, 
http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) (“[The 
PATRIOT Act] introduced a plethora of legislative changes which significantly 
increased the surveillance and investigative powers of law enforcement agencies in 
the United States.  The Act did not, however, provide for the system of checks and 
balances that traditionally safeguards civil liberties in the face of such legislation.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Perez, supra note 20, at A4 (“The bill approved Thursday includes 
new court oversight and additional administrative steps that terrorism investigators 
have to comply with.”); Charlie Savage, Panel Votes on Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2009, at A16 (“In its current form, the Senate bill would impose stronger oversight 
safeguards on the FBI’s use of these and related powers, such as by requiring new 
audits by the Justice Department’s inspector general. The bill would also cause several 
Patriot Act powers to expire after another four years without further legislation; a 
measure intended to ensure that lawmakers will continue to monitor how the powers 
are being used.”). 
 25. See ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, THE FBI & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A BRIEF CRITICAL 
HISTORY 172 (University Press of Kansas 2004). 
 26. Justina R. Cintron Perino, Developments in Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, 
36 URB. LAW. 387, 388 (2004) (quoting Samuel Walker’s definition of citizen 
oversight). 
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In practical terms, a civilian oversight agency includes a staff of 
investigators, an ombudsman, or citizen adjudicators who are 
unaffiliated with the police department.27  Their role is to determine 
whether an officer committed misconduct, or to determine whether a 
misconduct investigation was carried out thoroughly and without 
bias.28 
The concept of civilian oversight of the police began in the 
1920s29—and may have roots even further back than that.  In 1928, 
the Los Angeles Bar Association created a committee staffed by 
volunteer lawyers who investigated allegations of police misconduct 
and referred meritorious complaints to the Los Angeles Police 
Department for further investigation.30  Civilian oversight agencies 
emerged in the 1950s and the 1960s, with widespread establishment 
of the agencies occurring as a reaction to the civil rights movement.31  
However, the luster of civilian oversight began to fade by the late 
1960s, when many perceived the approach to be unhelpful and 
ineffective.32  Nevertheless, the movement began picking up steam 
again in the late 1980s and early 1990s.33  Today, besides being a 
fixture in most American cities,34 civilian oversight has spread 
overseas.35  The use of civilian oversight of the police in Northern 
Ireland is widely credited with being a key tool supporting the 
reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics.36  Notably, the 
 
 27. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 5, at 223 (noting that the categorization of a 
civilian review authority depends on whether a police officer or a civilian conducts 
the initial fact-finding, whether a police officer or civilian reviews the product of the 
investigation, whether the complainant has the right to appeal, and whether the chief 
of police is required to impose discipline). 
 28. Id. at 224. 
 29. WALKER, supra note 3, at 20.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Perino, supra note 26, at 387–88. 
 32. See WALKER, supra note 3, at 30–31 (explaining that in New York during the 
1960s civilian oversight hampered police efforts, and, consequently, police brutality 
for the sake of crime control and community safety was deemed tolerable).  
 33. Perino, supra note 26, at 388. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See NORTHERN IRELAND POLICING BOARD (Belfast, N. Ir.), THE LIFE AND TIMES 
OF THE FIRST NORTHERN IRELAND POLICING BOARD 4 NOVEMBER 2001 – 31 MARCH 2006 
(2006), available at http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/achievementdoc-2.pdf 
(observing that civilian oversight of the police has played a particularly prominent 
role in Northern Ireland); see also Shannon McNulty, Building Trust in Northern Ireland: 
The Role of Civilian Review of the Police, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 231–40 
(2002) (discussing the status of the national civilian review authority shortly after it 
had been implemented, and how reconciliation between the Catholic and Protestant 
populations has been linked to the successful operation of the Northern Ireland 
7
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Northern Ireland Policing Board has a national jurisdiction and its 
duties extend to monitoring anti-terrorist investigations by the 
national police, serving as evidence that civilians can oversee national 
police agencies and have access to sensitive information.37 
Civilian oversight comes in two general types: the investigatory 
model and the audit model.38  These models are further divided into 
classes.  Class I agencies (which are always investigatory-model 
agencies) are completely independent of the police department—
receiving, investigating, and adjudicating complaints of police 
misconduct.39  Class I agencies are staffed by non-sworn personnel and 
are fiscally and statutorily separate from the police department.40  
Class II, III, and IV agencies have varying levels of connection to the 
police department.41  These types of agencies are usually classed as 
audit-type agencies because they rarely conduct independent 
investigations.42  Instead, audit-model agency personnel review 
individual complaints investigated by the police department’s internal 
affairs unit, serve as appellate bodies for citizens dissatisfied with the 
internal affairs investigation, and monitor the policies and procedures 
of the police department, providing recommendations for improved 
operation.43  Class V agencies use a hybridized version of an audit and 
investigative model, where non-sworn personnel are hired and housed 
within the police department to adjudicate misconduct complaints.44 
The individual powers of the oversight agencies vary from city to 
city.45  Some civilian oversight agencies have the authority to issue 
subpoenas, although this tends to be a rare power.46  At least one 
review authority, although lacking subpoena power, requires police 
 
Policing Board).  
 37. Id.  
 38. See Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 151, 163 (2003) (explaining the different models of civilian 
review boards for police oversight). 
 39. Perino, supra note 26, at 388. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 388–89. 
 42. See id. at 389 (stating that these agencies “review, monitor, or audit the police 
department’s complaint process.”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. PETER FINN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CITIZEN REVIEW OF POLICE: 
APPROACHES AND IMPLEMENTATION (2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/184430.pdf (describing the major models of civilian oversight agencies and 
reviewing which cities have adopted which models). 
 46. See Perino, supra note 26, at 389–90. 
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officers to comply with investigations as a condition of employment.47   
B. The Perceived Benefits of Civilian Oversight 
There are more than 100 civilian oversight agencies in the Unit-
ed States covering about eighty percent of the largest cities and 
serving nearly one-third of the American population.48  As Jerome 
Skolnick and James Fyfe observe, the underlying attraction to civilian 
oversight is plain: 
[W]hen citizens ask for review of police conduct by civilians, 
they do so because they don’t trust the police to investigate 
themselves. The demand for civilian review thus implies a 
failure of police administration that . . . probably cannot be 
put right simply by employing more responsive administra-
tors. . . . Like the institution of the jury, which arose not be-
cause judges were incompetent to hear and evaluate 
evidence and reach verdicts, but because judges were mi-
strusted, so too with civilian review of police misconduct.49 
A police department’s internal affairs unit, operating on its own, 
lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is 
satisfactory to the community.50  Minneapolis city council members, in 
an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own 
political futures, established the city’s review authority.51  In theory, at 
least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation 
process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure 
that the investigation is conducted without bias.52  This, in turn, 
generally supports a perception by the community that its police 
department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights.53  
As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the 
 
 47. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 172.180 (2005). 
 48. WALKER, supra note 3, at 6.  
 49. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 5, at 224. 
 50. See id. (“Cops are not trusted to investigate other cops, even when they are 
perfectly capable of doing so . . . Mistrust of authorities has less to do with their 
competence than with their values, inclinations, and prior commitments, and with how 
these are perceived by those outside their organizations.”). 
 51. MICHAEL K. BROWNE, A STUDY OF THE POLICY AND PROCESS OF THE MINNEAPOLIS 
CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY 6 (2006) (on file with the author). 
 52. DOUGLAS W. PEREZ, COMMON SENSE ABOUT POLICE REVIEW 125 (1994) 
(“[T]he central theme of the discussion of those who favor civilian review is 
intuitively persuasive; some external perspective should be brought to bear on the 
investigation and deliberation of allegations of police misconduct, or the police will 
be left to police themselves.”)   
 53. Id. 
9
Weinbeck: Note: Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
2010] WATCHING THE WATCHMEN 1315 
community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and 
prevention.54   
There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establish-
ing a system of citizen oversight.  Chief among them is the political 
coverage that the city’s elected officials receive when establishing the 
agency.55  For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review 
Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the 
wrong house in a drug raid.56  During the course of the botched raid, 
the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house.57  In 
another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department 
broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a 
Minneapolis hotel.58  In response to both incidents, outraged 
community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized 
demonstrations.59   
Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen over-
sight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money.60  
Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter 
the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends 
up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the 
investigation.61 
Civilian oversight also plays another important role for U.S. po-
lice departments: it helps departments avoid, or end up being subject 
to, consent decrees that hand over departmental management to the 
U.S. Department of Justice.62  Under federal law, it is unlawful for a 
 
 54. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1159–60 (2000) 
(“[P]opular mistrust of government undermines the perceived legitimacy of the law, 
which in turn reduces public compliance with legal commands . . . . A government 
that cannot inspire obedience will likely be impotent in all but its ministerial 
functions. . . .”).  
 55. Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice 
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 20 (2003).   
 56. MICHAEL K. BROWNE, A STUDY OF THE POLICY AND PROCESS OF THE MINNEAPOLIS 
CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY 6 (2006) (on file with the author). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Samuel Walker & Vic W. Bumphus, The Effectiveness of Civilian Review: 
Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian Review of the Police, 11 
AM. J. POLICE 1, 19 (1992).  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS, NICOLE J. HENDERSON, & CHRISTOPHER W. ORTIZ, 
CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING? THE 
PITTSBURGH CONSENT DECREE 40 (2005), available at http://www.vera.org/
download?file=87/277_530.pdf (discussing efforts made by the City of Pittsburgh to 
end federal oversight of its police department). 
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governmental authority to “engage in a pattern or practice of conduct 
by law enforcement . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.”63  If the attorney general concludes that cities are 
violating the law, he may seek injunctive relief.64  If the court finds 
that the municipality has engaged in a pattern or practice of illegal 
conduct, it issues an order that places some or all aspects of the police 
department’s operation under the Department of Justice.65   
This authority of the federal government to take control of the 
operations of a local police department has been likened to the 
intervention of the federal government in civil rights cases involving 
school desegregation, employment discrimination, and prison-
condition cases.66  Since Congress adopted 42 U.S.C. § 14141 in 1994, 
the Department of Justice has used the authority granted it by the 
statute sparingly to correct police malfeasance,67 opting instead to use 
the threat of injunctive relief to exact compliance and reforms from 
local police.68   
Threatening a lawsuit has become such a fixture of § 14141 that 
some commentators suggest the Department of Justice formally 
institutionalize the practice.69  American cities, reluctant to tangle with 
the expansive authority of the Department of Justice, are often eager 
to establish or strengthen existing civilian oversight agencies in order 
to be able to present plausible evidence of a concern for the constitu-
 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2005). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration 
in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 
493 (2008) (“In practice, DOJ has initiated what some experts consider only a 
‘paucity’ of lawsuits, all of which have been resolved via court-enforced consent 
decrees.”). 
 66. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private 
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1402 (2000). 
 67.  Walker, supra note 55, at 4–5.   
 68.  Id. at 4–6.  Walker discusses several American cities (including Pittsburgh, 
Los Angeles, Cincinnati, and Washington D.C.) that entered into consent decrees or 
memoranda of understanding with the Department of Justice when faced with a 
threat of injunction.  Minneapolis also went through a similar process of dealing with 
the specter of a Department of Justice suit under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and it responded 
by agreeing to federally mediated negations with community representatives to come 
up with a multi-year agreement to achieve police reforms.  David Chanen, Police 
Mediation Pact to Be Signed: The Agreement Between Police and Mediators Covers Issues 
Between Law Enforcers and Community Groups, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS), Dec. 4, 2003, 
at 1B. 
 69. Simmons, supra note 65, at 490. 
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tional rights of their citizens.70 
Municipalities can also face liability for police misconduct under 
a claim made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.71  In City of Canton v. 
Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted § 1983 to make cities 
liable when there is evidence of “deliberate indifference” in the 
training schemes of the police department to the rights of the 
citizens.72  Lower courts have interpreted Harris to mean that police 
departments not only must avoid a deliberate indifference in training, 
but they must also avoid a deliberate indifference in investigating 
allegations of police misconduct.73  Again, civilian oversight has been 
seen as a way of protecting municipalities from the burden of federal 
litigation or oversight.74 
C. The Challenges and Flaws of Civilian Oversight 
Perhaps the most illuminating and damning weakness of the civi-
lian oversight system has been its inability to prove that its efforts 
actually result in a decrease in police misconduct.75  And a corollary 
flaw of civilian oversight agencies is their inability to require discip-
line.76  Few, if any, civilian review agencies have the power to require 
the imposition of discipline. Instead, the agencies send the result of 
their investigation and adjudication to the chief of police, who makes 
the final determination as to whether the police officer should be 
 
 70. CHRISTOPHER STONE, TODD FOGLESONG, & CHRISTINE M. COLE, POLICING LOS 
ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 2 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/Harvard_LAPD_Report.p
df.  
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003) (holding government agencies liable for “the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and  
laws. . . .”). 
 72. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 
 73. Hazel Glenn Beh, Municipal Liability for Failure to Investigate Citizen Complaints 
Against Police, 25 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 209, 225 (1998) (“Lower courts instantly 
extended Canton . . . to claims based upon a municipality’s inadequate system of . . . 
reviewing police misconduct. When challenging the adequacy of citizen complaint 
procedures, plaintiffs typically allege that the failure to . . . resolve citizen complaints . 
. . amounts to a policy of deliberate indifference to the need for police supervision.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Walker, supra note 55, at 22–23 (“Many external oversight agencies have 
been weak, ineffective, poorly led, and have not provided either satisfactory service to 
individual complainants or had any scientifically measurable effect on police 
misconduct.”). 
 76.  Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 653, 653 n.12 (2004). 
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held accountable for his or her misconduct.77  However, scholars tend 
to agree that this approach is appropriate because it does not disrupt 
the important command structure of a police department where the 
chief of police retains his or her authority, in part, by being seen as 
the powerful, final arbiter of acceptable police conduct.78  Chiefs of 
police exercise their independent judgment liberally, using their 
authority to trump the investigations of the oversight agency.79 
Another challenge often faced by civilian oversight agencies is 
the inability to disclose the results of their investigations and adjudica-
tions.80  It is frequently the case that a police officer’s personnel 
records are considered non-public data and the allegations against the 
officer and the contents of the investigation fall under the legally 
protected categories of private information.81  Investigations, hearings, 
and adjudications are usually kept away from the public except in 
cases of very egregious misconduct.82   
For example, the California Supreme Court held in 2006 that it 
was a violation of state statute to publicly disclose information 
contained in administrative appeals of discipline imposed on police 
officers—operating to cut off nearly all public disclosure of the 
decisions of civilian oversight boards.83  California’s civilian oversight 
agencies84 lobbied the California legislature to pass a statute that 
would reverse the ruling, but those efforts failed when law enforce-
 
 77. Bobb, supra note 38, at 163. 
 78. Livingston, supra note 76, at 653 n.12 (“Most scholars who have considered 
the subject have concluded that this limitation on the scope of citizen involvement is 
appropriate, lest the authority of the police chief and the chief’s responsibility for 
officer performance be undermined in a way that could ultimately prove detrimental 
to accountability. . . .”). 
 79. Rachel Fields & Steve Miletich, Cities Diverge in How They Police the Police, 
SEATTLE TIMES, July 22, 2007, at A1 (drawing analogies between the chiefs of police of 
Minneapolis and Seattle having failed to issue adequate discipline on police officers 
guilty of misconduct). 
 80. Perino, supra note 26, at 392. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288, 288 (Cal. 2006).  
Although Copley Press argued that public scrutiny of disciplinary decisions fostered 
public confidence in the law enforcement system, the court reasoned that other 
public policy interests were also at stake favoring confidentiality, including “protect-
ing complainants and witnesses against recrimination or retaliation, protecting peace 
officers from publication of frivolous or unwarranted charges, and maintaining 
confidence in law enforcement agencies by avoiding premature disclosure of 
groundless claims of police misconduct.”  Id. at 305.  
 84. National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, Resources, 
supra note 8. 
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ment unions launched a counter-effort.85  
In some instances, the outcome of a case is not even disclosed to 
the person who filed the complaint, as he or she is considered a 
member of the public and ineligible to access the police officer’s 
private personnel information.86  For example, the Minnesota 
Department of Administration, an agency charged with interpreting 
and enforcing the state’s data practices laws, has held that “it would 
violate an officer’s rights if the [Minneapolis Civilian Police Review 
Authority] disclosed to a complainant, absent the data subject’s 
consent, that his/her complaint was in whole or in part not sus-
tained.”87  
Commentators have suggested that such a lack of transparency 
has a chilling effect on the complainant’s willingness to go through 
the effort of filing a complaint with the agency.88  However, citizen 
oversight agencies are not barred from releasing summary data about 
the outcomes of cases.89  Such disclosures usually take the form of data 
and statistics about trends within the police department—
information that is so broad in scope that it cannot be tied back to a 
single police officer.90  Such disclosures can be distributed to the 
media and to community groups; and they often serve as a report card 
on the police department that police chiefs and municipal lawmakers 
use to inform policy decisions with regard to the police department.91 
Community faith in civilian oversight also appears to be ham-
pered by community perceptions of the oversight agencies them-
selves.  Swearing-contest complaints (where both the officer and the 
complainant allege foul language) often land at civilian oversight 
agencies, and the complaint often comes down to one party’s word 
against the other’s.92  Without dispositive evidence, the agency is 
 
 85. Patrick McGreevy, Effort to Open Files on Police Thwarted, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 
2007, at 1. 
 86. See, e.g., CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW AUTH., CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS,  ANNUAL REPORT 
2007, at 32 (2007), available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/cra/docs/
CRAannualreport2007.pdf. 
 87. Minnesota Department of Administration Advisory Opinion: 08-020 (2008), 
available at http://www.ipad.state.mn.us/opinions/2008/08020.html. 
 88. Perino, supra note 26, at 392. 
 89. Walker & Bumphus, supra note 60, at 20. 
 90. See, e.g., 2009 MPLS. CIVILIAN POLICE REV. AUTH., 3RD QUARTER REP., available 
at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/cra/docs/CRA_2009_3rd_Quarter_Report.pdf.  
 91. Bobb, supra note 38, at 161.  “The public monitoring reports, which address 
the fundamental excessive force and integrity issues in policing, are calculated to 
foster a constructive, task-oriented, and problem-solving dialog [sic], stripped of 
ideology and rhetoric.”  Id. 
 92. Walker, supra note 55, at 24. 
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reluctant to sustain the citizen’s complaint and the agency’s record of 
holding officers accountable begins to look no more impressive than 
the police department’s internal affairs unit.93  
Douglas Perez also observes that civilian review boards may fall 
short of their potential because the citizen adjudicators—after 
spending time with police officers—may begin to adopt the police 
officer’s perspective in the same way that internal affairs investigators 
supposedly do, leading to leniency with errant cops.94   
Further complicating the reputations of civilian review boards is 
the chance that the adjudicators may be made up of “vociferous, 
radical elements of the community . . . [who use] complaint hearings 
and policy hearings as platforms to espouse political rhetoric aimed at 
the police department, at police in America, and even at ‘the 
establishment’ generally.”95  
Annette Gordon-Reed notes that civilian oversight is also chal-
lenged merely by its status as an overseer of another agency: it is only 
natural to chafe at being “overseen,” because this imputes an 
assumption that the person under scrutiny is prone to dishonesty or 
incompetence.96  She observes further that “only a minority of 
agencies are ever subjected to this type of outside scrutiny.”97 
The unique nature of law enforcement seems to deepen the sting 
of oversight: not only are police officers highly trained practitioners, 
they work in a field where they regularly face life-threatening dangers 
to keep the public safe.98  Rebelling at the idea of non-sworn watch-
men—who presumably have never faced the dangerous situations 
that police officers face on a daily basis—appears to be both natural 
and justifiable.99 
D. A Halftime Summation 
As the foregoing suggests, civilian oversight is not a cure-all.  But 
the numerous and serious flaws of civilian review have not operated to 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. PEREZ, supra note 52, at 155. 
 95. Id. at 155–56. 
 96. Annette Gordon-Reed, Watching the Protectors: Independent Oversight of 
Municipal Law Enforcement Agencies, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87, 98 (1995). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See ANTHONY BOUZA, POLICE UNBOUND: CORRUPTION, ABUSE, AND HEROISM BY 
THE BOYS IN BLUE (2001); MICHAEL W. QUINN, WALKING WITH THE DEVIL: THE POLICE 
CODE OF SILENCE (2005) (offering excellent narrative accounts of the dangers of 
policing). 
 99. BOUZA, supra note 98, at 257-59.  
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stem its growth.  About eighty percent of the police departments in 
the fifty largest American cities have some form of oversight,100 and 
civilian review continues to expand domestically and internationally.101   
Further expansion of civilian review would likely benefit from an 
approach that is more responsive to the mistakes of the past.  Many of 
the challenges discussed above that have burdened civilian review 
appear to be avoidable simply by taking certain steps at the front end: 
selecting the civilian overseers with great care, mandating a robust 
disciplinary requirement, and creating systems that can track the 
success of the oversight agency. 
As Sam Walker has noted, federal law enforcement agencies have 
been “conspicuously absent from the oversight movement.”102  Could 
the federal exception to civilian review be overcome if oversight 
agencies had a better arsenal of fail-safes?  Regardless of the reason 
for federal non-participation in civilian review, it appears that the 
current approach to addressing misconduct by federal officers is 
inadequate. 
III. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OVERSIGHT TODAY 
A. Misconduct is Present 
The FBI has been at the center of many firestorms for agent mis-
conduct.  A 2004 study by the bureau revealed that FBI agents had 
been found to have committed rape, attempted murder, bribery, and 
extortion.103  Other reports have revealed a disparity between how 
discipline is imposed when senior-level agents commit acts of 
misconduct versus junior-level agents.104 
The agency has also gained notoriety for its approach to whistleb-
lowers, and the need for reform has been well publicized, especially 
by Iowa Senator Charles Grassley.105  In 2007, a federal jury in 
Minneapolis awarded Jane Turner, a 25-year veteran of the FBI, 
 
 100. WALKER, supra note 3, at 40. 
 101. Id. at 41. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Jerry Seper, FBI Disciplined 77 Agents Over 14-Year Period: Crimes Included Bribery 
and Rape, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at A5. 
 104. Dan Eggen, Report: Brass Behaving Badly: Most Managers Got Lighter Discipline 
Than Subordinates, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2003, at A8. 
 105. See, e.g., Dan Browning, Accounting Sought from FBI Director: Iowa Sen. Grassley 
Wants to Know How Many Supervisors Have Been Disciplined for Retaliation, and if Three in 
Particular Played a Part in a St. Paul Agent’s Case, STAR TRIB.(MINNEAPOLIS), Feb. 28, 
2007, at 4B. 
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$565,000 after she prevailed on claims of retaliation by superiors.106  
Turner alleged that her superiors required her to transfer to another 
office in retaliation for an equal-employment opportunity lawsuit she 
had filed, and for reporting an FBI agent who took a Tiffany crystal 
globe found in the wreckage of the World Trade Center towers after 
September 11, 2001.107   
Advocates of whistleblower reform have been disappointed by the 
actions of President Barack Obama, who promised to reform federal 
whistleblowing policies when he was elected president.108  But when 
the president signed an economic stimulus package in February 2009, 
whistleblower provisions had been stripped from the law.109 
B. How FBI Oversight is Currently Carried Out 
The FBI has nearly 33,000 employees, almost 14,000 of which are 
special agents.110  The agency’s system for handling complaints is 
aimed almost exclusively at complaints arising from within the agency 
(that is, complaints raised by other FBI employees).111  The agency’s 
website provides no information for a member of the public to file a 
complaint.112 
When an FBI employee raises a concern about another em-
ployee’s conduct, the complaint triggers a multi-step investigative 
process.113  When an FBI official receives a complaint, the agency’s 
policy requires that the complaint be sent to the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Inspector General (OIG).114  Normally, the OIG will 
refer the case back to the FBI to carry out the investigation, unless the 
complaint involves criminal misconduct or high-level FBI administra-
 
 106. Jerry Seeper, Senator Presses FBI for Disciplining, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at 
A4.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Joe Davidson, Whistleblower Advocates Disappointed but Determined, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 17, 2009. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Federal Bureau of Investigation, About Us—Quick Facts, 
http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).  
 111. GRIFFIN B. BELL & LEE COLWELL, STUDY OF THE FBI’S OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 12 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/opr/
bellreport.pdf. 
 112. FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation Homepage, http://www.fbi.gov (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2010). 
 113.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS DIV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division, 
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM, (May 2009), 
at ii, available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/e0902/final.pdf. 
 114. Id. at 2. 
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tors.115  Cases that are referred back to the FBI are sent to the agency’s 
Internal Investigations Section in the Inspections Division, where the 
investigation is carried out by either internal affairs staff or by staff 
members in the field who are assigned to the special investigation.116  
Upon completion of the investigation, the case is sent to the FBI’s 
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and the OPR decides 
what—if any—discipline to impose.117 
The FBI’s complaint investigation process structurally resembles 
the process that a local police department would follow for an 
internal affairs investigation.118 
Congressional oversight has been another, frequently employed 
method of overseeing federal intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies.119  However, congressional review of the work of federal 
agencies has been problematic: first, because it tends to be political; 
and second, because it tends to be unpredictable.  As Sidney Shapiro 
notes in his commentary on reduced effectiveness of congressional 
oversight of regulatory policy: 
Congress employs a variety of monitoring and reporting 
methods, but the efficacy of those approaches has been li-
mited because . . . they have been tied to a fire alarm ap-
proach. . . . In fire alarm oversight, legislators depend on 
third parties to call to their attention agency policies that 
 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 3. 
 117. Id.  
 118. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPT. INTERNAL AFFAIRS UNIT, CITY OF 
MINNEAPOLIS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2008), available at 
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/about/docs/IADAnnualReport2008.pdf. In 
Minneapolis, a complaint to internal affairs is first reviewed by the city attorney to 
determine whether the alleged misconduct merits criminal charges.  See id. at 11.  If 
the city attorney declines pursuing charges, the case goes back to internal affairs 
where officers assigned to the unit conduct an investigation.  Id.  Upon completion of 
the investigation, the internal affairs unit may propose discipline.  Id.   Imposition of 
discipline must be approved by the chief of police or an administrator selected by the 
chief.  Id.  The process used by the FBI is also roughly similar to the oversight process 
used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  See A. John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet 
Ipsos Custodes:  The CIA’s Office of General Counsel?, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL. 201, 210 
(2008).  The CIA complaint process differs from the FBI internal oversight process 
because a complaint to the CIA’s Office of General Counsel may lead the complain-
ing employee to being called to testify before a congressional committee.  See id. at 
211.  
 119. Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair “The Broken Branch”, 89 B.U. 
L.REV. 765, 773 (2009) (“Congress has repeatedly turned to the oversight and 
investigative powers of its committees to police the executive branch.  And, at least 
anecdotally, when Congress wields its oversight powers forcefully, it can lead to 
genuine changes in public policy.”). 
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deviate from congressional preferences. . . . Fire-alarm over-
sight has the potential to generate favorable publicity with-
out requiring a substantial time commitment from 
legislators, which permitted them to emphasize more politi-
cally profitable activities such as passing legislation.  This 
approach did not result in systematic oversight, however.120   
Political partisanship is also thought to contribute to the unpre-
dictability of congressional oversight.121  In December 2005, the New 
York Times reported on unauthorized wiretaps by the National Security 
Agency (NSA).122  At the time, a Republican president occupied the 
White House and a Republican majority operated in both houses of 
Congress.123  Political pressure exerted by both the executive branch 
and Republican party leaders stifled congressional oversight of the 
NSA’s actions.124  Congress eventually passed the Terrorist Surveil-
lance Act of 2006, which greatly loosened the restrictions on the NSA 
to seek approval before conducting a wiretap.125   
In some respects, Congress operates as a form of civilian over-
sight since congressional representatives are not law enforcement 
agents;126 they are non-sworn civilians who are in a position (by virtue 
of their power to control commerce and declare war) to oversee the 
law enforcement and intelligence-gathering activities of the govern-
ment.127  However, Congress’s interest in providing robust oversight 
has ebbed and flowed throughout history, with robust congressional 
 
 120. Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994). 
 121.  Kriner, supra note 119, at 784. 
 122. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 123.  Although this incident involved a Republican president and a Republican 
Congress, I found no literature that would suggest that intelligence misconduct has 
anything to with whether either party controls both the executive and legislative 
branches and, if so, which party controls. 
 124. Tara M. Sugiyama & Marisa Perry, The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program: An 
Analysis of Congressional Oversight During an Era of One-Party Rule, 40 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 149, 171 (2006). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See PATRICK LEAHY, CHARLES GRASSLEY & ARLEN SPECTER, FBI OVERSIGHT IN THE 
107TH CONGRESS BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: FISA IMPLEMENTATION FAILURES, 
4–5(2003), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030200fisafailures.pdf 
(FBI and the individual liberties of citizens are both benefited by the external 
oversight of Congress). 
 127. David Everett Colton, Comment, Speaking Truth to Power: Intelligence Oversight 
in an Imperfect World, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 590 (1988) (“Congress’s right to oversee 
the Executive’s conduct of intelligence activities is rooted in the congressional powers 
enumerated in the Constitution, and in Congress’s broad investigatory power as 
recognized by the Court.”). 
19
Weinbeck: Note: Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
2010] WATCHING THE WATCHMEN 1325 
action usually coming in reaction to cataclysmic failures of the law 
enforcement (and intelligence) community.128  
Although the judicial branch of government may offer some 
measure of oversight to the FBI, its reach is often limited by statutory 
deference to security-based priorities.129  Constitutional challenges to 
legislation, such as the PATRIOT Act, may curb law enforcement 
wrongdoing by bringing about systemic change.130  But other types of 
efforts to seek judicial redress—through tort litigation, for exam-
ple—often fail to work as preventative measures because governmen-
tal leaders usually lack the coordination to respond systemically to the 
lawsuits.131  As Samuel Walker observes, “Academic studies of the 
strategy [of tort litigation] have generally found little direct impact on 
police reform.  The flaw in the strategy appears to be the assumption 
that public officials will act in a rational and coordinated manner in 
response to rising litigation costs.”132 
Moreover, criminal prosecutions of errant law enforcement offic-
ers are also considered to be ineffective.133  Prosecutors—by the 
nature of their work—have close relationships with law enforcement 
 
 128. Compare Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: 
Congressional Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REV. 721, 725 (2007) (“[The few past 
instances] of congressional action followed a similar pattern: long periods of 
executive autonomy punctuated by short bursts of congressional oversight grounded 
in public revelations of impropriety or illegality in the Intelligence Community.”), 
with Colton, supra note 127, at 582–89 (describing three phases of congressional 
oversight from the 1970s to the 1990s that roughly correspond to the three phases of 
the interrelationship between the executive and congressional powers described by 
Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 129. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 559 (2006)  (observing that judicial oversight of 
document-production regimes available to the FBI under the PATRIOT Act largely 
bar judicial oversight because the only threshold requirement for a document 
demand is the FBI’s self-certification that it is acting in good faith); Daniel J. Solove, 
Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1296 (2004) 
(observing that electronic surveillance laws do not give the judicial branch enough 
oversight authority). 
 130. See Hillary & Kubasek, supra note 20, at 66 (discussing a constitutional 
challenge to section 215 of the PATRIOT Act). 
 131.  Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 
Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 775–76 (1993) (“[C]ity 
governments approach civil suits against individual officers or the police department 
defensively, rather than addressing the larger social issues underlying the suits. Local 
officials are constrained by social, political and economic factors that militate against 
any active pursuit of police reform.”). 
 132. Walker, supra note 55, at 18. 
 133. Walker, supra note 55, at 19. 
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officers.134  Proving criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt is a 
difficult task given the easy defense for a law enforcement agent that 
he or she faced a physical risk.135  And, finally, juries and judges tend 
to be highly deferential to law enforcement officers.136 
C. The President’s Intelligence Oversight Board: A Closer Fit? 
According to Amnesty International, the FBI is not subject to any 
civilian oversight.137  While this is functionally true, it is technically 
incorrect in at least one respect: in 1956, President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower established the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board (PFIAB),138 and, in 1976, President Gerald Ford established a 
subcommittee of the board known as the Intelligence Oversight 
Board.139  PFIAB’s purpose is to assess the “quality, quantity, and 
adequacy of intelligence collection, of analysis and estimates, and of 
counterintelligence and other intelligence activities.”140   
The Intelligence Oversight Board was a reaction by President 
Ford to public disclosure of domestic spying operations by the CIA 
aimed at disrupting antiwar efforts during the Nixon administra-
tion.141  After the disclosures, President Ford appointed Vice President 
Nelson Rockefeller to head a commission charged with investigating 
the CIA’s domestic spying operations.142  The Rockefeller Commission 
reported back to the President with several recommendations for 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RIGHTS FOR ALL 25 (1998), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/ (go to bottom of page and type “AMR 
51/035/1998” into the “AI Index” search field).  
 138. Christine E. Hinrichs, Student Essay, Flying Under the Radar of an Unnecessary 
Intelligence Watchdog: A Review of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 5109, 5110 (2009). 
 139. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. § 90 (1976). 
 140. Exec. Order No. 12,863, 3 C.F.R. §§ 632, 632–33 (1993).  Just as the 
Intelligence Oversight Board has been accused of suffering from shortcomings, the 
PFIAB also has been under fire because it has no requirement of regular meetings, 
the appointees to the board are political allies of the President and do not necessarily 
have a particular skill in the intelligence field, and it has a history of tension with 
members of the intelligence community.  Hinrichs, supra note 138, at 5113–14.  
Because the Intelligence Oversight Board is a subcommittee of the PFIAB (and 
because its members not only have oversight of intelligence-gathering operations, but 
also the more controversial issue of acts of intelligence-gathering misconduct), it is 
unlikely to have a reputation better than that of the PFIAB as a whole. 
 141.  See Ford, supra note 128, at 739. 
 142.  Ford, supra note 128, at 745. 
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bringing more oversight to the intelligence committee.143  As a 
consequence, the President signed an executive order regulating 
multiple aspects of American intelligence-gathering services.144 
Any member who qualifies to serve on the President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board can also serve on the Intelligence 
Advisory Board.145  To be appointed to the foreign intelligence board, 
“one must only be a trustworthy and distinguished citizen and be 
appointed by the President—knowledge of intelligence issues is not a 
prerequisite.” 146  The purpose of the Intelligence Advisory Board is to 
inform the President and the Attorney General of intelligence 
misconduct.147 
During the Clinton administration, the board disapproved of the 
administration’s policy of allowing arm shipments from Iran to 
Bosnia, and it complained that the CIA had a policy of employing 
known torturers and killers as informants in Latin America.148  During 
the first two years of the administration of President George W. Bush, 
the Intelligence Oversight Board was mute because the President had 
not appointed its membership.149   
President Bill Clinton armed the Intelligence Oversight Board 
with the authority to report misconduct by intelligence officers 
directly to the Attorney General, but that authority was removed by 
President Bush in February 2008 and, instead, misconduct was 
reported directly to the President.150  To the satisfaction of some 
commentators, President Obama recently signed an executive order 
restoring the board’s power to report misconduct directly to the 
 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. (“[Executive Order 11,905 was] the first publicly known regulation 
concerning the operation and function of the Intelligence Community.”). 
 145.  Exec. Order No. 11,905, supra note 139. 
 146.  Hinrichs, supra note 138, at 5110.  Executive Order 11,905 calls for the 
members of the three-member Intelligence Oversight Board to “be from outside the 
Government and be qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of 
background and experience.”  Exec. Order No. 11,905, supra note 139. 
 147. John Solomon, In Intelligence World, A Mute Watchdog, WASH. POST, July 15, 
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/14/ 
AR2007071400862.html. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (reporting that once the members of the Intelligence Oversight Board 
were appointed by President Bush, the body issued no findings for five-and-a-half 
years, despite public revelations by the FBI of hundreds of acts of intelligence-
gathering misconduct). 
 150. Charlie Savage, Obama Order Strengthens Spy Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 
2009, at A16.  
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Attorney General.151  However, once misconduct is reported to the 
Attorney General by the Intelligence Oversight Board, no investigative 
action is required by the Justice Department.152  Moreover, the board 
was appointed nearly a year after President Obama took office, and it 
is still unclear what its modus operandi will be.153   
IV. CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
A. Civilian Oversight Has Been Met With Suspicion But Has Promise 
With the expansion of the authority of federal law enforcement 
agents, the federal government’s authority to affect the rights of U.S. 
citizens has expanded greatly.  As noted above, this expansion in 
power has been accompanied by what appears to be an increase in 
violations of individual rights.  Few Americans would have believed a 
decade ago that today our society would be engaging in a serious 
debate about the efficacy of torture and the legitimacy of wiretaps.  
Issues that had long appeared to have been settled in favor of 
individual rights are in play again. 
The national security arguments for the expansion of federal law 
enforcement authority are persuasive.  But as the balance of power 
shifts away from the people and towards the policymakers at Langley 
and Quantico, calls for greater oversight are also persuasive.  Federal 
policymakers have been remiss in not establishing new avenues of 
oversight and strengthening existing avenues.   
Historically, civilian oversight of law enforcement has been 
treated with suspicion by the FBI.  J. Edgar Hoover, the former head 
of the FBI, said that he thought communists were behind civilian 
review boards.154  The Intelligence Oversight Board has largely 
operated as window dressing; although President Obama has restored 
 
 151. Id. (“Suzanne E. Spaulding, a former deputy counsel at the Central 
Intelligence Agency . . . praised Mr. Obama for partly rolling [President Bush’s 
changes] back. ‘What this does is to restore some of the independence to this advisory 
board, and that’s very important,’ she said.”). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Josh Gerstein, Under the Radar: Where’s the PIAB, POLITICO, Jan. 7, 2010, 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0110/Wheres_the_PIAB.html. 
 154. PEREZ, supra note 52, at 125 (“As Hoover put it, ‘Their altruistic mouthings 
are a front and a sham[,] for they have already prejudged law enforcement as an 
enemy to their nihilistic cause.  Their real objective is to intimidate and harass 
police.’”).  It is ironic, however, to consider Hoover’s comments in light of the role 
that the FBI often plays today investigating claims of police officer misconduct that 
have been referred to the bureau by local prosecutors wary of appearing to have a 
conflict of interest. 
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some of its prior power, even at the zenith of its authority, the board 
commanded little respect.155 
However, an oversight scheme that takes into account the pitfalls 
that have befallen municipal agencies may have a greater chance of 
success.  Unfortunately, there has been a paucity of commentary on 
creating a mechanism for civilian oversight of federal intelligence and 
law enforcement.156  One commentator, in proposing a model of 
civilian oversight for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
suggests a “bipartisan commission made up of Presidential appointees 
[that] would be responsible for investigating individual complaints of 
civil rights violations by immigration officials or customs agents and 
making disciplinary and policy recommendations.”157 
B. The Need for Civilian Oversight 
The individual rights being threatened by the expansion of fed-
eral law enforcement authority are deeply personal.  Installing a 
robust system of civilian oversight makes philosophical sense: when 
the most precious individual rights are being affected, it becomes 
imperative for the citizens to be at the table to influence the conversa-
tion. 
 
 155. Daniel B. Silver, The Uses and Misuses of Intelligence Oversight, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L 
L. 7, 14–15 (1988) (“To date, however, the public image of [the Intelligence 
Oversight Board] fails to inspire confidence that it is a strong organ of internal 
executive branch oversight. The Board is made up of part-time members and has 
virtually no staff. It is hard to conceive, given the limitations on its resources, that it 
can play a forceful role.”).  Notably, Silver’s comments about the Intelligence 
Oversight Board echo the complaints that commentators often have about local 
civilian oversight boards.  See, e.g., Walker, supra note 55, at 23–24 (“External 
oversight agencies fail for a variety of reasons unrelated to the underlying concept of 
citizen oversight.  Some fail because they lack the authority to accomplish their stated 
objectives. . . . Others fail because of a lack of resources: e.g., not having sufficient 
number of investigators relative to the size of the police department and the 
complaint caseload. . . .  Others fail because of a lack of political support. . . .”). 
 156. But see Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Keeping an Eye on the I.N.S.: A Case for Civilian 
Review of Uncivil Conduct, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 5 (1994) (describing a scheme for installing 
a system of civilian oversight at the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service). 
 157.  Id. at 16–17.  Ultimately, Rosenbaum concludes that civilian review would 
serve as a good solution for the Immigration and Naturalization Service if it is 
perceived as “accessible, confidential, prompt, impartial and even-handed.”  Id. at 42.  
These standards compare favorably with the code of ethics that the National 
Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement calls for in a civilian oversight 
agency.  National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement Code of 
Ethics, http://nacole.org/images/stories/pdf/nacolecodeethics.pdf (last visited Mar. 
16, 2010).  Among the requirements it includes are: outreach, confidentiality, 
professional excellence, and respectful and unbiased treatment.  Id. 
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The current system of confronting FBI misconduct appears to 
operate with a pre-9/11 mindset.  And even by that standard, it is still 
lacking.   
While civilian oversight does not offer a perfect solution, it does 
offer some signposts.  Foremost, civilian oversight is a means of 
bolstering the faith of citizens in the functions of their government.  If 
the federal government were to establish an agency unconnected 
with, and un-beholden to, any federal law enforcement agency, it 
would likely contribute to a reduced cynicism about the anti-terrorist 
efforts of government. 
C. A Proposed System of Federal Civilian Oversight 
A federal system of civilian oversight should exploit the best prac-
tices of the municipal oversight models and abandon—or at least 
minimize—the practices that have burdened the local systems.  
Recalling the discussion above, civilian oversight appears to be at its 
zenith when it operates to call attention to gross misconduct, 
encourage political pressure for reform, and create the perception of 
unbiased, direct citizen oversight.  And civilian review is hampered 
when public disclosure is limited, discipline for misconduct is lax, and 
the board members are unqualified for the work.158  With these 
attributes in mind, what might a civilian oversight model look like at 
the federal level?  
Ideally, the agency would be made up of a board of citizens who 
have been thoroughly trained in the work of the agency.  The board 
would be structured to allow for areas of specialization, and the 
members would be given security clearances to view classified 
information that may be contained in the complaints. 
To prevent the political conflicts that have sometimes plagued 
municipal boards,159 board members would be selected for four-year 
terms, and the terms would expire in odd-numbered years.  These 
changes avoid the politicization of the major election cycles.  Half of 
the members would be congressional appointees and half would be 
appointed by the President. 
To aid in systematic data-gathering and reporting, the agency 
would be an arm of one of the government’s auditing functions—
possibly the Government Accounting Office.  Funding for the 
 
 158.  See WALKER, supra note 3, at 186–87 (discussing the attributes of effective 
civilian oversight). 
 159. Id. at 9. 
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oversight agency would be statutorily guaranteed. 
Alternatively, a system of civilian oversight might be achieved by 
expanding the auspices of the Intelligence Oversight Board.  Since 
the board is established through an enabling executive order, 
legislative wrangling is avoided and an operational system could be 
implemented more quickly.  However, without a legislative mandate, 
the Intelligence Oversight Board rests on the goodwill of the Presi-
dent.  A board created by statute (negotiated between the White 
House and Congress) may have a better base for long-term survival 
and effectiveness. 
Given the complex and specialized nature of the complaints, it 
would probably be infeasible for any civilian oversight agency to have 
its own investigative staff.  Instead, the civilian oversight board would 
serve as an auditor to investigations being carried out by the law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies.  All complaints under 
investigation would be dual-filed with the board, and the members 
would select which cases would undergo a board review. 
As noted above, the imposition of discipline is a key considera-
tion.  If the board finds an investigation or an imposition of discipline 
inadequate, it should have the authority to require the law enforce-
ment or intelligence agency head to reconsider the case.  If the 
agency head makes no changes to the disposition, he or she would be 
required to provide the board with an explanation of the decision.  If 
the board is still dissatisfied with the outcome, it would have the 
authority to refer the case to the President and to the appropriate 
congressional committee for further action. 
The board would also establish a federal system for filing citizen 
complaints.  No matter which federal law enforcement agency the 
citizen interacted with, the board would serve as a one-stop clearing-
house for complaint filing.  Complaints could be filed on the web.  All 
individuals who are taken into federal custody or subjected to federal 
investigation would be apprised of the existence of the board and 
given an opportunity to file a complaint. 
D. Applying Civilian Oversight to Intelligence Services 
In the post-9/11 world, the U.S. government has deliberately 
attacked the traditional wall of separation between federal law 
enforcement and intelligence-gathering activities.160  Today, the FBI 
 
 160. Craig S. Lerner, The USA Patriot Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign 
Intelligence Gathering and Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 493, 496 (2003). 
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regularly engages in intelligence-gathering work to protect national 
security and has run into corollary problems with abuses of power.161  
A former general counsel to the CIA and the National Security 
Agency has concluded that, absent major changes to the congression-
al approach to oversight, progress on oversight reforms are unlikely to 
be realized: “Nor can progress be achieved as long as the Congress 
misuses its oversight role as a point of attack on executive branch 
primacy in foreign relations, and misuses the oversight committees as 
the forum for partisan foreign policy disputes with the Administra-
tion.”162  
Consequently, it bears mentioning that, while civilian oversight 
has traditionally been applied strictly to law enforcement, there is 
little to suggest that its use could not extend to oversight of intelli-
gence-gathering activities.  Indeed, given the blurring of lines within 
the FBI between its traditional law enforcement roles and its develop-
ing intelligence-gathering roles, it would seem counterintuitive not to 
apply an oversight model holistically. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Civilian oversight has been met with many challenges in Ameri-
ca’s cities.  But, with more than 100 civilian oversight agencies in the 
United States, it appears to be a solution that provides enough 
community satisfaction to justify its continued existence. 
In addition, oversight mechanisms that the federal government 
currently employs are insufficient to stand up to the expansive 
authority that has been granted to America’s law enforcement 
agencies.  Given the inconsistent results that come from each branch 
of the government when trying to oversee the nation’s law enforce-
ment and domestic intelligence-gathering activities, new approaches 
are needed.  A system of civilian oversight will provide some measure 
of satisfaction to a public deeply concerned for the stewardship of its 
civil liberties. 
 
 
 161. See Solomon, supra note 10, at A1. 
 162. Silver, supra note 155, at 17. 
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